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Nature, Man and logos: an outline  
of the Anthropology of the sophists2 
Abstract
The paper aims at reconstructing the fundamentals of the sophistic an-
thropology. Contrary to the recognized view of the humanistic shift which 
took place in the sophistic thought, there is evidence that the sophists were 
continuously concerned with the problems of philosophy of nature. The 
difference between the sophists and their Presocratic predecessors was 
that their criticism of the philosophical tradition and the transformative 
answers given to the old questions were the basis and the starting point of 
the “ethical” and “rhetorical” part of their intellectual activity. This natu-
ralistic perspective is reflected in their research in the field of medicine and 
biology, in the discussion about “the human nature”, and in their interest in 
the individual physiological and mental conditions, which determine the 
state of the human body and the behaviour of a man. The sophists pioneered 
in linguistic, rhetorical, and philological studies. To enhance the power of 
persuasion, they investigated how various mental conditions influenced 
cognitive processes and physiological reactions. Thus they started a thor-
ough examination of the human psyche, initiating the field of psychology. 
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Although the originality of the sophists in each of the aforementioned as-
pects is undeniable, a complete picture of the sophists can only be achieved 
by examining the sources of their thought: the Presocratic philosophical 
tradition, Hippocratic medicine, and earlier literary tradition.
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It is generally accepted nowadays that a group of professional teachers – the rep-
resentatives of the so-called “Sophistic Movement” (Kerferd, 1981b) – along with 
Socrates (Kerferd, 1981a) have contributed to the humanistic turn in philosophy, 
shifting the focus from natural to moral philosophy and (as Cicero remarked 
about Socrates) “calling philosophy down from the heavens” (Cicero, 1927). The 
view of this radical humanistic shift, which took place in the fifth century B.C., 
had become prevailing already in late antiquity and was re-established in modern 
scholarship in the fundamental works of the German historians of philosophy such 
as E. Zeller (1856), F. Ueberweg (1876), H. Diels (1884), and W. Nestle (1940). 
In opposition to this recognized view, which (as it was remarked by E. Capizzi 
(1955) originated under a strong influence of Hegel’s philosophy of history, the 
more recent contributions of E. Dupréel (1948), M. Untersteiner (2009), and 
G.B. Kerferd (1981b) provided many reasons to argue that at least in the sophistic 
thought, there was never any radical transition from philosophy of nature to the 
research focused on man and “humanistic” problems (Emsbach, 1980). There is 
evidence that the sophists such as Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Polos, Prodicus, 
Alcidamas, Antiphon, and Critias were continuously concerned with the problems 
introduced by the Presocratic philosophy of nature (Segal, 1962). The difference 
between the sophists and their Presocratic predecessors is not that these sophists 
have completely changed the subject of their interests, but rather that their criti-
cism of the philosophical tradition and the transformative answers given to the 
old questions were the basis and the starting point of the “ethical” and “rhetorical” 
part of their intellectual activity (Guthrie, 1971).. Following this perspective, it 
is necessary to reconstruct the fundamentals of their thoughts and, subsequently, 
make an attempt to establish how the answers that the sophists gave to these ques-
tions ultimately influenced their teaching. 
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1. tHE viEw of rEAlity 
The reconstruction of the view of reality, which can be associated with the soph-
ists is a real problem because the content of few extant fragments and testimonies 
is limited to criticism of the Eleatic notions of one and being (Kerferd, 1981b). 
But, there is one underestimated source, namely Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus, 
which gives an opportunity to reconstruct some features of Protagoras’ view of 
reality. Though it is a very controversial issue to what extent we can trust Plato 
as a doxographer, there is no doubt that according to Plato’s report in Theaetetus, 
Protagoras was an upholder of Heraclitean doctrine of universal flux. And, as it 
is argued, there are many arguments supporting the view that Plato’s account is 
trustworthy (Nerczuk, 2009). 
Protagoras claims there that the beginning of all things is motion, which is the 
source (arche) of “that, which passes for existence, that is, of becoming” (Plato, 
1921, p. 53). The opposite of it, namely “inactivity” or “rest” causes “non-existence 
and destruction” (Plato, 1921, p. 45). The reality is composed of “things” (chre-
mata), which are in constant motion. Change is the source of everything what is 
falsely called “being”. In fact, as it is said, there is no being, but everything is in 
the state of “becoming”. Because of the variability of chremata, one cannot rightly 
say that something is “one” (hen) (Palmer, 1999), “is anything” (ti) or is qualified 
in some way (opoionoun). The reality is itself contradictory and this is why it is 
possible to predicate contradictory statements in relation to everything. 
2. tHE sopHists AND MEDiCiNE
In the view of the sophists, who might have been under the influence of Hippo-
cratic medicine (Kerferd, 1981b), a man is a biological creature and a part of the 
world of nature (Nestle, 1940). 
Preserved source materials confirm that some of the sophists conducted their 
own research in the field of medicine and biology. Prodicus’ work On nature 
testifies that he was concerned with problems of anatomy and physiology (Guthrie, 
1971). Critias, who claimed that a man’s soul is contained in blood, might have 
been inspired by Empedocles, who was a philosopher and a physician (Guthrie, 
1971). 
The idea of “the human nature” was derived by the sophists from the Hip-
pocratic medicine (Jaeger, 1944). In the remaining testimonies, we may find some 
remarks concerning “human nature” and natural laws, to which it is subject. The 
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laws of nature are prevalent to the differences between people, the source of which 
is culture and civilization. Birth and death determine the natural limits of human 
life (Diels & Sprague, 1972). Men, like other living creatures, are subject to natural 
instincts of survival and procreation. To survive, a man must meet his needs, such 
as breathing and nutrition (Kerferd, 1981b). The biological development of a man 
requires that he would take care and exercise his body and soul. These two parts 
of a man are interdependent and determine human behaviour contingent on his 
mental and physiological stimuli. Moreover, there is a close relationship between 
mental affections (pathe) and physiological reactions (Flashar, 1956). 
The medical writers and the sophists have a common interest, especially in the 
individual physiological and mental conditions, which determine the state of the 
human body and the behaviour of a man. In Hippocratic medicine, this problem 
was related to the discussion on the possibility of applying the general principle to 
individuals (Hippocrates, 2005). Thus, medical writings contain many observations 
on specific diseases and symptoms related to each individual case. Their sophistic 
parallels stress the particularity of conditions, which individuals are subject to and 
point out the impact of private affections on the results of cognition (Brett, 1912). 
Following this line of thinking, both Protagoras and Gorgias took interest in the 
differences of one man’s perception, which reflect the differences of conditions 
such as good health and illness, dreaming and being awake as well as youth and 
old age. 
3. CoGNitioN
The interest in idiosyncrasy of physical and mental disposition of a man is the basis 
of the view that the standard of knowledge (analogously to the standard of the indi-
vidual therapy) (Hippocrates, 2005) should be grounded in perception (aisthesis). 
This empirical perspective can be observed in the sophistic view on the process 
of cognition. The sophists accepted Parmenides’ claim related to the relationship 
between thought and being (Kenny, 2004). But, they were also inspired by two 
other traditions. Under the influence of the Hippocratic medicine, they took into 
account the state of the perceiving subject. They were also inspired by Empedocles’ 
theory of mechanism of perception (Diels, 1884) and by Xenophanes’ remarks on 
unreliability of human experience (Diels & Kranz, 1968). 
The combination of these traditions resulted in the new, anti-Eleatic theory of 
knowledge based on perception (aisthesis) and experience (empeiria) (Schiappa, 
2003). According to Plato’s report in Theaetetus, Protagoras has provided a defi-
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nition of knowledge. He defined it as perception, which not only embraced the 
sensual apprehensions, but also the emotions (i.e., pleasures and pains, desires, 
fears) and dream-images (Cornford, 1935). In his speech entitled Palamedes, 
Gorgias differentiated knowledge, the source of which was direct, personal experi-
ence, and uncertain opinion (doxa), referring to that, which was beyond the range 
of autopsy (Diels & Sprague, 1972). The acceptance of perception as the source 
of knowledge resulted in a belief that human cognition, at least with reference to 
everything what is beyond direct sense-perception, has a fragmentary and confined 
character. 
In Theaetetus, Plato presents a wider context of Protagoras’ man-measure 
principle (homo-mensura), which is associated with the view of changing reality 
and the theory of perception (Deschardin, 1990). This doctrine, which Plato at-
tributes to Protagoras and unnamed Heracliteans, takes its name from the convic-
tion that colour, which is an example illustrating the way in which the process of 
perception takes place, is neither anything that exists in the object nor anything 
that is in someone’s eyes. Colour is brought into existence somewhere between the 
perceiving organ and the perceived object (Plato, 1973). The “things” (chremata) 
constituting the changing reality are therefore the results of interaction between 
the sensory-organ and the motion that comes from the external object. 
Such a definition negates any kind of the objective knowledge of reality. The 
world as it is perceived is composed of things (chremata), which are constituted 
in the individual and particular acts of perception. Things are just appearances 
(phainomena). There is no other way a thing persists “except so far as it is some-
thing falling within the range of somebody’s perception” (Fuller, 1931). Chrema 
is always momentary, particular, and private. It “is” not, it appears “something” 
or “of certain quality”. Each particular man is the measure of all things “because 
the changing experience of each individual bounds and constitutes his particular 
universe” (Fuller, 1931). According to Protagoras, there are as many “truths” as 
individuals who live in their particular worlds, which are constituted by their 
unique and “private” affections (pathe). 
The belief in the reliability of all perceptions results in the removal of categories 
related to truth and falsehood (Dupréel, 1948). As we may read in Theaetetus, those 
categories were replaced by Protagoras by the notions of “better” and “worse”. 
Each man is the measure and everyone has his own world based on his own 
perceptions, but an inevitable interaction with the “worlds” of other individuals 





The ontological and epistemological views of the sophists are the basis of their 
interest in the language, which led them to examine the ontological status of 
a discourse (logos), the conditions determining the process of communication, and 
“correctness of words and names” (i.e. adequate and inadequate ways of predicat-
ing of reality [orthoepeia]). 
One of the main problems, which were reconsidered by the sophists, was the 
Eleatic issue of the relationship between discourse (logos) and being (Kerferd, 
1981b). The whole problem was introduced by Parmenides, who in his poem 
(as it may be inferred from the preserved fragments), postulated the correspond-
ence between being and thought (logos). This thesis of Parmenides was critically 
reconsidered by Gorgias and Protagoras. 
Gorgias of Leontinoi, who in his treatise On non-being or the Non-Existent, 
aimed at refuting the fundamental dogmas of the Eleatic tradition pondered in 
the third thesis of his writing if it was possible to communicate any knowledge 
of being to another person (Diels & Sprague, 1972). Gorgias’ conclusion was 
negative. According to him, logos is something different from being and what is 
conveyed through words to another person is not external reality, but just words 
(Verdenius, 1981).
The conception of logos as a mere means of communication, which can be 
used to convey either true or false messages, finds its expression in two surviving 
works of Gorgias, namely Encomium of Helen and Palamedes (Segal, 1962). 
In his Encomium of Helen, the rhetorician extols the enormous power of logos 
mentioning speech, which “written with art, but not spoken with truth, bends 
a great crowd and persuades” (Diels & Sprague, 1972). And in his other rhetorical 
declamation Palamedes, Gorgias presents a desperate situation of an unjustly 
accused hero, who is aware that his salvation is fully dependent on persuasive 
power of his apology. 
The question of the status of logos can also be found in Protagoras. The view 
of reality as a flux and the definition of knowledge as a perception are reflected in 
Protagoras’ conception of logos. According to him, all perceptions are true by virtue 
of their reference to being (Plato, 1921). But in Protagoras’ world of flux, unlike 
in Parmenides’ view of “changeless being”, there is no strict relationship between 
logos and ‘being’ in its static, Eleatic sense. There is no “one by itself”, but there 
are just endless chains of things in motion (chremata). Correspondingly, there is no 
universal truth, but there are just particular, individual “discourses”, which express 
private, particular, and contradictory affections of individuals (Emsbach, 1980). 
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Convinced of the significance of this discourse, Gorgias took up research 
focusing on language. Here, he pointed out the complexity of the act of persuasion, 
which is not necessarily dependent on whether the message is true or false, but 
is determined by persuasive “power” of the discourse itself. Reflecting Gorgias’ 
view, the narrow limits of individual cognition are the reason why human reality 
is to a large extent constituted by words and, therefore, constantly reinterpreted 
(Consigny, 1992). The discourses form the human reality in such a manner, that the 
words in a sense become “beings” themselves (Hoffman, 1925). The realisation of 
this creative role of logos led many sophists to research the conditions of the act of 
persuasion and to analyze a number of factors, which could enhance the persuasive 
power of speech (Kennedy, 1963). The main category became the notion of “the 
power of logos” (dunamis tou logou). This category is implied in Protagoras’ 
statement: “to make the weaker argument stronger” (Diels & Sprague, 1972). It 
can also be found in Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus, where in the speech delivered by 
Socrates, Protagoras is credited with saying that his task is to replace the “worse 
opinions” with the “better ones” by the means of words (Plato, 1921). Gorgias, in 
his Encomium of Helen, praises logos as “a powerful lord which by means of the 
finest and most invisible body” (Diels & Sprague, 1972) can form human opinions. 
According to Gorgias, the power of logos is so immense that it equals physical 
violence (bia) (Diels & Sprague, 1972). The rhetoric is thus the most powerful 
of the arts because it helps rhetoricians achieve the greatest good, that is: “the 
power of persuading by words, I should call it, the judges in a court of law, or the 
councillors in a council-room, or the assembly men in an assembly, or any other 
kind of meeting which is convened for a public purpose” (Plato, 1864). Considering 
this enormous power of logos, the sophists often compared their rhetorical skills 
with martial arts. The refutations presented by Euthydemos and Dionysodoros, 
the sophists depicted in Plato’s dialogue Euthydemos, are the grotesque examples 
of this new art. The verbal contests, which both sophists practice and teach, are 
a new form of their old profession; they used to be pancratiasts and now they give 
instruction in the art of contending with words. 
5. rEAsoN AND EMotioNs
To intensify the influence of logos upon the soul, the sophists began to research 
both elements of that relation namely, discourse and soul. They pioneered in 
linguistic, rhetorical and philological studies (Kerferd, 1981b). They also started 
a thorough examination of the human psyche, initiating the field of psychology 
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(Brett, 1912). Contrary to the earlier Pythagoreans, who were interested in the 
eschatological aspect of the soul, the sophists focused on its “psychological di-
mension”, that is the soul conceived as a complex, composed of emotional and 
rational part, both of them influencing human acts and beliefs. For this reason, 
problem of sensations which embraced both cognitive (beliefs, perceptions) and 
emotional (pleasure, sadness, desire, and fear) elements (Plato, 1921), appeared 
in the centre of their interest. 
This awareness of the two different aspects of human soul led the sophists to 
develop techniques, which aimed at increasing the persuasive power of speech; 
this was done by addressing both rational and emotional part of the soul (Hal-
liwell, 1994). The sophist Gorgias mentioned with pride that by the means of the 
art of persuasion he succeeded to persuade his patients who refused “to take their 
medicines, or to submit to be operated upon either by the knife or the cautery, when 
the physician failed to persuade him” (Plato, 1864). While Gorgias believed that 
this was a good example of the immense power of logos, in Plato’s opinion, this 
was just an illustration of rhetorical deception (apate), an example of a case when 
one ignorant person persuades another ignorant person (Plato, 1864). 
To enhance the power of persuasion, the sophists investigated how various 
mental conditions influenced cognitive processes and physiological reactions. 
They reflected upon peculiar emotions, such as love, fear, desire and the illusions: 
“such fancies as result from wrong hearing, or wrong seeing, or any other false 
perception” (Plato, 1875). Protagoras discussed the specific affections (pathe) 
experienced by a man in the state of sleeping and being awake as well as in sick-
ness and good health (Plato, 1921). Gorgias in his Encomium of Helen praised 
logos, which was able to “stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture 
pity” (Diels & Sprague, 1972). He further pointed out that people experienced 
“fearful shuddering and tearful pity and grievous longing” (Diels & Sprague, 
1972). Another sophist, Antiphon, established his private quasi medical practice 
removing sorrows by the means of words (Diels & Sprague, 1972). 
*
The starting point of the sophistic anthropology, a fundament upon which they 
construct their ethical and political doctrines, is their real interest in the world of 
nature. Their studies in medicine and biology, which lead to the belief in universal 
relativity, Protagoras’ and Gorgias’ theories of perception and the sophistic ex-
amination of psychological and physiological constitution of a man, testify that 
the complete picture of the sophists can only be achieved by examining those two 
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aspects of their intellectual activity, namely both their criticism of the Presocratic 
tradition and its creative adaptation and continuation.
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